The recession may be technically over but its effects on our life and language are far from it. In fact, some recession words have become so ubiquitous – staycation, for one (see below) – that they just might be here to, ahem, stay.
Recession language isn’t a new phenomenon. Thanks to the Great Depression we have terms like: Okie, dirt poor, and baloney (to mean ridiculous, not the mystery sandwich meat). Even the term “depression” has been attributed to Herbert Hoover, who is thought to have wanted to avoid using the more common, but more alarming terms “panic” or “crisis” to describe what subsequently became known as the Great Depression.
So, in the spirit of trying to laugh at our collective condition, we’ve compiled a lexicon of our Top 10 favorite words birthed by the recession. Laugh, cry, and submit your favorite new-economy words in the comments below.
Recession slang: 10 new terms for a new economy
10. Funemployment, n. The practice of enjoying one’s unemployment.
The funemployed subscribe to the philosophy that in the face of bleak employment prospects, it’s better to make the most of time off by catching up with old (read: also unemployed) friends or developing low-cost hobbies, ideally during normal business hours to realize the additional benefit of irking ones employed friends.
Sample sentence: As part of my funemployment plan, I’ve joined an Ultimate Frisbee league and am providing foster care to three puppies.
See also: Funderemployed (adj.) taking a job that’s fun because employment that pays well or is in one’s field is unavailable.
9. Insource, v. To do oneself what one previously paid others to do.
Sample sentence: “No, I can’t meet you for brunch this morning. I’m insourcing my laundry these days and have five loads piled up.”
Alternate sample sentence: “I know my nails look like someone took a chainsaw to them, but I insource manicures now.”
Antonym: outsource.
8. Staycation, n. Vacationing at home or near home because traveling further would be prohibitively expensive.
For better or worse, staycation is perhaps the most widely-used and accepted term of the new-economy lexicon.
Sample sentence: “That’s right, if something doesn’t change, we’re going to have to staycation at my in-laws this summer … again.”
7. Intaxication, n. A sense of delight mingled with the perception of instant wealth that one feels upon receiving a tax refund.
Sample sentence: “It seemed like a good idea to charge that pair of Louboutins/small boat/Caribbean vacation to my credit card when I got my tax refund. But when I got my statement a week later, it was clear I was in a haze of intaxication at the time of purchase.”
6. Madoff’d, v. To get ripped off in a particularly offensive fashion.
Sample sentence: “Oh man, that cab driver totally Madoff’d me. I gave him a $20 and he only gave me change for a $10.”
5. Recessionista, n. A consumer who has historically paid big bucks to look like a million bucks and who, unwilling to quit his/her fashion habit in the face of the recession, has found alternative ways to maintain a certain standard of wardrobe.
Such strategies often include shopping at discount and second-hand stores. More prevalent in the media than in everyday conversation.
Sample sentence: “The clerks at Barneys are suffering from withdrawal now that I’m a recessionista and rent my handbags online instead of buying.”
4. Mancession, n. A recession, such as this most recent one, which hits men harder than women.
Sample sentence: “The extent of this mancession became clear to me when I realized it was all dads in F-250s in the carpool line.”
See also: he-cession.
3. Povo, adj. A two-syllable “abbreviation” for poor, often with a mocking or self-defacing tone that lacks any serious derision or the class implications associated with “poor” or “poverty.”
Derivation: Australian (Aussie) English
Sample sentence (better if said with faux Australian accent): “We’re living sans Internet and cable now that my povo roommate won’t chip in for it anymore. It’s like the 1980s around here.”
2. Permatemp, n. The condition of being permanently employed as a temporary worker.
This could be due to lack of motivation to seek permanent employment, inability to find permanent employment, or the permatemp’s belief that a company will eventually hire him/her for the job s/he is currently doing for lower pay and without benefits.
Sample sentence: “Wake up, Joe. You’ve been here for six months, your cubicle is decorated better than your living room, and the hiring manager still doesn’t know your name. You’re officially a permatemp, my friend.”
1. Decruited, adj. To be fired from a position one has not even started yet.
Sample sentence: “At first I felt really bad about being decruited from that corporate law firm after spending two summers of law school interning for them. But then I decided to make the most of my funemployment and use my signing bonus to travel around Europe.”
The last major silver short squeeze was in 1980. During the squeeze, the New York and Chicago exchanges halted silver trading several times. Whenever markets were disrupted, the price quoted in New York did not match the price buyer had to pay for the actual silver.
Premiums above the spot price for silver got very high – as much as $10 per Troy ounce. However, people were happy to pay the high premiums, and glad to get silver in almost any form. Customers were not concerned about brands, shapes, or sizes of silver bars, or denominations of U. S. 90% silver coins. They just wanted silver.
S T A G F L A T I O N
America was almost in a depression during the 1970s. Economists called it stagflation. We had high unemployment and sky-high fuel costs. And, inflation was terrible. The U. S. economy was in pretty bad shape; but not in the shambles it is now.
After the U. S. abandoned a gold standard in 1971, people began buying gold and silver coins to protect themselves from the dollar’s loss of purchasing power. Most coin and bullion buyers weren’t looking for paper dollar profits. They wanted tangible assets to hedge against a crumbling dollar.
T H E L A S T M A J O R S I L V E R S H O R T S Q U E E Z E
Silver was $1.95 per ounce in the early 1970s, when Nelson Bunker Hunt, William Herbert Hunt, and other wealthy investors began accumulating physical silver. They informed the public they would be systematically building physical positions in silver. Over a period of years, silver moved from $5 to about $11 per ounce mid-1979. Silver was more than $30 per ounce at the end of 1979.
The Hunt brothers’ long position was 100 millionounces of silver. On each delivery month, the Hunts and other investors paid off their contracts and were taking delivery of the silver (5,000 ounces of silver per contract). Until then, there never had been so much demand for so much physical silver on the exchanges. *
As silver began moving sharply up in 1979, the bullion banks were facing “fails to deliver” on their open contracts. It was rumored nine directors of the COMEX held massive short positions in silver. The situation was called a silver short-squeeze. At the end of the squeeze, the market was near collapse and the shorts were almost broken. The short squeeze threatened the very viability of the exchange. The rules for trading silver on the COMEX (Commodities Exchange New York) and CBOT (Chicago Board of Trade) were changed many times until the squeeze came to an end.
W H E N T H E E X C H A N G E S H A L T E D S I L V E R T R A D I N G
The exchanges stopped trading silver several times during the silver short squeeze (and during its aftermath). There were “limit up” days, “limit down” days, and “liquidation only” days. There was uncertainty in the exchanges, tremendous price volatility, and extraordinarily wide spreads (big percentages between bid and ask). Locking in prices over the phone became risky for customers, wholesalers, and dealers.
In those frantic days, people stood in lines half-way around city blocks at coin shops throughout the country, hoping dealers would not run out of silver. People even traded with each other while standing in lines. Supplies of silver bars and silver coins were strained to the breaking point.
C O M E X S I L V E R : L I Q U I D A T I O N O N L Y
Time after time, exchanges such as the COMEX and the CBOT raised margin requirements in an attempt to drive the price of silver down, and make it too expensive for investors to stay “long” in the silver market.
Then, they limited the number of contracts investors could buy. In New York, customers were limited to 10 million ounces of silver; the CBOT put on a limit of 3 million ounces. In March 1980, the CFTC (U. S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission) finally broke the back of the silver short squeeze.
Silver was on its way to $50/oz. The final game rule was changed to stop the price advance. The CFTC banned all purchases of silver contracts, allowing liquidation only.
Silver tumbled 50% in four days.
The total decline was 78% in two months.
After the silver market plummeted, it remained in the tank for more than twenty years. The shorts made fabulous profits. And, those on the other side of the trade lost their shirts. With the price of silver in the $20s, the Hunts were unsuccessful in their efforts to raise capital to pay margin calls. The Hunts declared private bankruptcy in 1980. In the end, Hunt liabilities were $2.5 billion and their assets had been reduced to $1.5 billion.
The Hunt brothers were not big enough
to fight the financial insiders bankrolled
by the Federal Reserve; or powerful enough to counter the actions of the CFTC.
In August 1988, the Hunts were convicted and heavily fined for “conspiring to manipulate the market.”
The Hunt brothers were not the conspirators. They were the victims of the same short-sellers who manipulate the prices of precious metals to this day.
PROGRAM AVAILABILITY IS DEPENDENT ON YOUR COUNTRY OF RESIDENCY AND FINANCIAL STATUS
PAST RESULTS ARE NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. EXAMPLES OF HISTORIC PRICE MOVES OR EXTREME MARKET CONDITIONS ARE NOT MEANT TO IMPLY THAT SUCH MOVES OR CONDITIONS ARE COMMON OCCURRENCES OR ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR.
HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS HAVE MANY INHERENT LIMITATIONS, SOME OF WHICH ARE DESCRIBED BELOW. NO REPRESENTATION IS BEING MADE THAT ANY ACCOUNT WILL OR IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE PROFITS OR LOSSES SIMILAR TO THOSE SHOWN IN FACT, THERE ARE FREQUENTLY SHARP DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND THE ACTUAL RESULTS SUBSEQUENTLY ACHIEVED BY ANY PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM. ONE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS IS THAT THEY ARE GENERALLY PREPARED WITH THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT.
IN ADDITION, HYPOTHETICAL TRADING DOES NOT INVOLVE FINANCIAL RISK, AND NO HYPOTHETICAL TRADING RECORD CAN COMPLETELY ACCOUNT FOR THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL RISK IN ACTUAL TRADING. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ABILITY TO WITHSTAND LOSSES OR TO ADHERE TO A PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM IN SPITE OF TRADING LOSSES ARE MATERIAL POINTS WHICH CAN ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS. THERE ARE NUMEROUS OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO THE MARKETS IN GENERAL OR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY SPECIFIC TRADE PROGRAM WHICH CANNOT BE FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE PREPARATION OF THE HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND ALL OF WHICH CAN ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS.
BID/ASK SPREADS, BROKERAGE COMMISSION, CLEARING, EXCHANGE AND REGULATORY FEES WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE NET OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF YOUR ACCOUNT. PRIOR TO MAKING A DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY INVESTMENT MAKE SURE YOU FULLY UNDERSTAND THE FEES ASSOCIATED WITH TRADING.
THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS REPORT CONTAINS RESEARCH, MARKET COMMENTARY AND TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS. YOU MAY BE SOLICITED FOR AN ACCOUNT BY ONE OF OUR REPRESENTATIVES OR EMPLOYEES. IT SHOULD BE KNOWN THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR FIRM MAY TRADE FUTURES AND OPTIONS FOR THEIR OWN ACCOUNTS OR THOSE OF OTHERS. DUE TO VARIOUS FACTORS (SUCH AS MARGIN REQUIREMENTS, RISK FACTORS, TRADING OBJECTIVES, TRADING INSTRUCTIONS, TRADING STRATEGIES, AND OTHER FACTORS) SUCH TRADING MAY RESULT IN THE LIQUIDATION OR INITIATION OF FUTURES OR OPTIONS POSITIONS THAT DIFFER FROM THE OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOUND IN THIS REPORT.
PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE PERFORMANCE. THE RISK OF LOSS IN TRADING FUTURES CONTRACTS OR COMMODITY OPTIONS CAN BE SUBSTANTIAL, AND THEREFORE INVESTORS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE RISKS INVOLVED IN TAKING LEVERAGED POSITIONS AND MUST ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH INVESTMENTS AND FOR THEIR RESULTS.
YOU SHOULD CAREFULLY CONSIDER WHETHER SUCH TRADING IS SUITABLE FOR YOU IN LIGHT OF YOUR CIRCUMSTANCES AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES.
Expect a maximum of 3, 0.25% rate hikes by December 2018
Rates will not “normalize” this decade
True economic recovery will take far longer than than the most pessimistic of Fed guesstimates.
A-C on the chart below shows the markets expectations for rate hikes
A) In January 2013 the market was pricing in 6 , 0.25% rate hikes by December 2018, with the spread between the June 2016 (GEM16) and December 2018 (GEZ18) deliveries at 1.50, position value 3,750.00 USD
B) By November 2013, optimism for US economic recovery and rate normalization peaked with the market pricing in 10, 0.25% rate hikes with the spread at 2.50, position value 6,750.00 USD
C) Current rate hike expectations have dropped to less than 3, 0.25% hikes, with the spread at 0.6250, position value 1,562.50 USD
D) If the market had faith in the Fed’s projections the spread between the June 2016 (GEM16) and December 2018 (GEZ18) deliveries would be 2.50 reflecting the Fed’s expected 10, 0.25% hikes, position value 6,250 USD.
To convert the contact delivery price into rate it represents take 100.00 – contract price = the rate.
Example, 100.00 – the December 2016 contract price of 99.17 = an expected rate of 0.83%.
To calculate expected rate increases between delivery months take the nearby delivery minus the forward delivery equals the expected rate change between the delivery months.
Example, June 2016 delivery trading at 99.3350 – December 2016 at 99.1700 = the expected increase in rates from June 2016 to December 2016 = 0.1650%.
What U.S. price action tell us.
The market’s perception of economic recovery is far worse than the Fed’s.
Rates will not “normalize” during this decade.
Fed and US fiscal policy makers creditability with the market is at a low
Eurozone market expectations are worse.
A) In January 2013 the Eurozone expected an increase in the 3 month Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EuriBor) between June 2016 (IMM16) and December 2018 (IMZ18) of 0.6000%, position value 1,500.00 EUR
B) By November 2013 optimism for Eurozone economic recovery and rate normalization peaked with an expected increase in the EuriBor rate between June 2016 (IMM16) and December 2018 (IMZ18) of 1.10%, position value 2,750.00 EUR
C) Currently optimism for Eurozone economic recovery and rate normalization has hit a low with an expected increase in the EuriBor rate between June 2016 (IMM16) and December 2018 (IMZ18) at 0.10%, position value 250 EUR.
Converting the contact price into rate increase/decrease and between delivery months works the same as the US.
Use the quotes on this Exchange pageto calculate today’s Eurozone rate expectations through March 2022
3 Month EuriBor price action tells us
The EuriBor rate is expected to move 0.0350% lower during 2016
The market sees only a 0.0700% rate increase between now and December 2018
The EuriBor rate will remain negative through December 2019
Eurozone rates will not “normalize” this decade
United Kingdom, nearly the same
A) In January 2013 the UK market action expected an increase in UK 3 month rates between June 2016 (LZ16) and December 2018 (LZ18) of 1.20%, position value 3,000.00 GBP.
B) By January 2014 optimism peaked with the market at 1.60%, position value 4,125.00 GBP.
C) Currently UK market action says a 0.30% increase, position value 750.00 GBP.
Using the quotes on this exchange pageconversions and expected increase/decrease work the same as the U.S. and Eurozone.
What the Global Stock markets telling us about “economic recovery”
Let’s skip all the subjective fundamental economic over analysis and look at the big picture price action. Price action is telling us uncertainty and doubt about economic recovery has now spread into the global equity markets.
On the 16 year S&P chart below note the current volatility relative to the overall rate of change, The monthly moving average (green) has been violated, the majority of the price action is now below the moving average.
Does this market look like it’s in a healthy up trend to you?
Increased volatility relative to the overall rate of change, the DAX has broken below the monthly moving average (green), the majority of the price action is now below the moving average and the long term trend appears to be changing from up to down.
Increased volatility, the market has broken below the monthly moving average (green), the majority of price action now remains below the moving average, the long term trend appears to be shifting from up to down.
Put opinions aside, trade with the trend, long or short
Learn new markets and strategies.
Trade whatever market/sector has the highest return on risk
Define your risk on your trades and for the duration of the trading period without wasting precious investment capital on option time premium to hedge risk.
One example of defined risk trade using the Euro Stoxx 50traded at EUREX
Looking at the chart below is it really that hard to identify the current daily trend using the moving average (green) ? We’ve seen the break below the daily moving average with the majority of current price action now below the average.
Eurozone rate expectations sum up the economic fundamentals. The EuriBor is pricing in lower rates during 2016 moving from the current negative 0.2550% to negative 0.2900% by December 2016. EuriBor traders are telling us loud and clear true economic recovery isn’t expected for the Eurozone in 2016.
Structuring a defined risk trade shorting theEuro Stoxx 50
A) Short the Euro Stoxx 50 at 3,000, position value 30,000 EUR B) Write the 2,800 put collecting premium C) Using the collected premium purchase the 3,200 call to hedge the short position
Risk is defined on the trade and for the duration of the trading period
This trade cannot be stopped out regardless of market volatility, the only thing needed to be profitable is anticipating the market’s overall direction correctly.
The trade can be liquidated at any time , you do not need to hold the position to expiration.
The only way the 3,000 short can be pulled away is at a 2,800 generating a gross profit of 2,000 EUR.
If the market reverses and rallies to 3,800 losses above 3,200 are hedged by the 3,200 call with losses limited to 2,000 EUR.
If the market stays the same and you’ve structured your trade correctly you should break even as you’ve collected as much time premium on the 2,800 put write against your 3,000 short as you’ve paid out for the 3,200 call to hedge.
Effective “option collar” strategies are not limited to the international futures markets they can be employed in any market that has underlying option liquidity.
Examples
Baxter International Inc (BAX) – NYSE, Bank of America Corporation (BAC) – NYSE, General Electric Company (GE) – NYSE, SPDR S&P 500 Trust ETF (SPY) – NYSEARCA, iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF (EEM) – NYSEARCA, SPDR S&P Metals and Mining ETF (XME) – NYSEARCA, Pfizer Inc. (PFE) – NYSE, Apple Inc. (AAPL) – NASDAQ, SPDR Gold Trust ETF (GLD) – NYSEARCA, iPath S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures ETN (VXX) – NYSEARCA, Market Vectors Gold Miners ETF (GDX) – NYSEARCA, Ford Motor Company (F) – NYSE, Financial Select Sector SPDR ETF (XLF) – NYSEARCA, iShares China Large-Cap ETF (FXI) – NYSEARCA, Shares Russell 2000 ETF (IWM) – NYSEARCA,
Let’s take a look how a “collared” position protected me in AppleAAPL
I’m sure I wasn’t the only one caught long Apple AAPLat 130 USD in July 2015
I made the mistake of getting too attached to being long this stock from 75.00 USD and stayed long in July 2015 at 130.00 USD despite the daily trend telling me it was questionable.
The weekly trend was telling me I was wrong
The monthly still appeared up with only a few “bumps” against the moving average and no sustained price action below the average.
The technical indicators continued to deteriorate
Rather than reverse to short or liquidate my Apple position I maintained my long hedging it up with a collar shown A-C on the chart below.
A) At the time I put down the collar AAPL was at 129.62 USD B) I wrote the 140.00 1 month call against my long C) Using the collected premium I purchased the 120.00 put
Price action got ugly quick and the market broke hard eventually taking out 110.00 USD which was disappointing but tolerable as I had my 120.00 put hedge in place negating any losses below 120.00.
I delivered my longs at 120.00, had I not “collared” this position it could have been far worse, AAPL eventually violated 95.00 USD on that run lower and has not seen a sustained move above 120.00 since.
This Apple trade was yet another refresher course for me not getting too “attached” to a stock, to pay attention to price action and not fight market momentum.
If you’re attached to your long shares or index positions (as I was too apple) you too might want to take a good hard look at the current price action and start “collaring up” positions to prevent a financial character builder.
I don’t think anyone knows for sure where the peak will be for the S&P 500 and Global equity markets.
What we do know for sure is when the S&P 500 and Global equities break the financial impact can be worse than a divorce and five kids in private school.
Using “collars” to control risk on my short to intermediate directional trades has cut my stress level on these trades by 70%.
Additional information
3 month rates or Eurodollar depositsare time deposits denominated in U.S. dollars at banks outside the United States. (There is no connection with the euro currency ). The term was originally coined for U.S. dollars deposited in European banks, but it’s expanded over the years to its present definition-a U.S. dollar-denominated deposit in any non US bank for example Tokyo or Beijing would be deemed a Eurodollar deposit. Futures open interest (contracts outstanding exceeds 10 trillion,
Euriboris short for Euro Interbank Offered Rate. The Euribor rates are based on the average interest rates at which a large panel of European banks borrow funds from one another. The Euribor rate is considered to be the most important reference rates in the European money market. The interest rates do provide the basis for the price and interest rates of all kinds of financial products like interest rate swaps, interest rate futures, saving accounts and mortgages.
Short Sterling prices are based on the British Bankers Association London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) for three month sterling deposits in units of 500,000.00 GBP. 3-Month Sterling Futuresare traded on the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange, part of NYSE Euronext. Each contract is for Interest rate on three month deposit of £500,000 of 3-month Sterling.
The Standard & Poor’s 500, often abbreviated as the S&P 500, or just “the S&P”, is an American stock market index based on the market capitalizations of 500 large companies having common stock listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ. The S&P 500 index components and their weightings are determined by S&P Dow Jones Indices. It differs from other U.S. stock market indices, such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average or the Nasdaq Composite index, because of its diverse constituency and weighting methodology. The “Composite Index”,as the S&P 500 was first called when it introduced its first stock index in 1923, began tracking a small number of stocks. 3 years later in 1926, the Composite Index expanded to 90 stocks and then in 1957 it expanded to its current 500. S&P 500 futures trading began in 1988, e-mini contract 1997.
The DAX (Deutscher Aktienindex (German stock index)) is a blue chip stock market index consisting of the 30 major German companies trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Prices are taken from the Xetra trading venue. According to Deutsche Börse, the operator of Xetra, DAX measures the performance of the Prime Standard’s 30 largest German companies in terms of order book volume and market capitalization It is the equivalent of the FT 30 and the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
The Nikkei 225, the Nikkei Stock Average is a stock market index for the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). It has been calculated daily by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei) newspaper since 1950. It is a price-weighted index (the unit is yen), and the components are reviewed once a year. Currently, the Nikkei is the most widely quoted average of Japanese equities, similar to the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The Nikkei 225 Futures, introduced at Singapore Exchange (SGX) in 1986, the Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE) in 1988, Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) in 1990, is now an internationally recognized futures index.
The EURO STOXX 50 is a stock index future of Eurozone stocks designed by STOXX, an index provider owned by Deutsche Börse Group and SIX Group. Its goal is “to provide a blue-chip representation of Supersector leaders in the Eurozone”. It is made up of fifty of the largest and most liquid stocks. The index futures and options on the EURO STOXX 50, traded on Eurex, are among the most liquid futures contracts in the world
PROGRAM AVAILABILITY IS DEPENDENT ON YOUR COUNTRY OF RESIDENCY AND FINANCIAL STATUS
PAST RESULTS ARE NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. EXAMPLES OF HISTORIC PRICE MOVES OR EXTREME MARKET CONDITIONS ARE NOT MEANT TO IMPLY THAT SUCH MOVES OR CONDITIONS ARE COMMON OCCURRENCES OR ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR.
HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS HAVE MANY INHERENT LIMITATIONS, SOME OF WHICH ARE DESCRIBED BELOW. NO REPRESENTATION IS BEING MADE THAT ANY ACCOUNT WILL OR IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE PROFITS OR LOSSES SIMILAR TO THOSE SHOWN IN FACT, THERE ARE FREQUENTLY SHARP DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND THE ACTUAL RESULTS SUBSEQUENTLY ACHIEVED BY ANY PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM. ONE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS IS THAT THEY ARE GENERALLY PREPARED WITH THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT.
IN ADDITION, HYPOTHETICAL TRADING DOES NOT INVOLVE FINANCIAL RISK, AND NO HYPOTHETICAL TRADING RECORD CAN COMPLETELY ACCOUNT FOR THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL RISK IN ACTUAL TRADING. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ABILITY TO WITHSTAND LOSSES OR TO ADHERE TO A PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM IN SPITE OF TRADING LOSSES ARE MATERIAL POINTS WHICH CAN ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS. THERE ARE NUMEROUS OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO THE MARKETS IN GENERAL OR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY SPECIFIC TRADE PROGRAM WHICH CANNOT BE FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE PREPARATION OF THE HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND ALL OF WHICH CAN ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS.
BID/ASK SPREADS, BROKERAGE COMMISSION, CLEARING, EXCHANGE AND REGULATORY FEES WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE NET OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF YOUR ACCOUNT. PRIOR TO MAKING A DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY INVESTMENT MAKE SURE YOU FULLY UNDERSTAND THE FEES ASSOCIATED WITH TRADING.
THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS REPORT CONTAINS RESEARCH, MARKET COMMENTARY AND TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS. YOU MAY BE SOLICITED FOR AN ACCOUNT BY ONE OF OUR REPRESENTATIVES OR EMPLOYEES. IT SHOULD BE KNOWN THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR FIRM MAY TRADE FUTURES AND OPTIONS FOR THEIR OWN ACCOUNTS OR THOSE OF OTHERS. DUE TO VARIOUS FACTORS (SUCH AS MARGIN REQUIREMENTS, RISK FACTORS, TRADING OBJECTIVES, TRADING INSTRUCTIONS, TRADING STRATEGIES, AND OTHER FACTORS) SUCH TRADING MAY RESULT IN THE LIQUIDATION OR INITIATION OF FUTURES OR OPTIONS POSITIONS THAT DIFFER FROM THE OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOUND IN THIS REPORT.
PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE PERFORMANCE. THE RISK OF LOSS IN TRADING FUTURES CONTRACTS OR COMMODITY OPTIONS CAN BE SUBSTANTIAL, AND THEREFORE INVESTORS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE RISKS INVOLVED IN TAKING LEVERAGED POSITIONS AND MUST ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH INVESTMENTS AND FOR THEIR RESULTS.
YOU SHOULD CAREFULLY CONSIDER WHETHER SUCH TRADING IS SUITABLE FOR YOU IN LIGHT OF YOUR CIRCUMSTANCES AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES.
PROGRAM AVAILABILITY IS DEPENDENT ON YOUR COUNTRY OF RESIDENCY AND FINANCIAL STATUS
PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE PERFORMANCE. THE RISK OF LOSS IN TRADING FOREX OR FUTURES CONTRACTS OR OPTIONS CAN BE SUBSTANTIAL, AND THEREFORE INVESTORS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE RISKS INVOLVED IN TAKING LEVERAGED POSITIONS AND MUST ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH INVESTMENTS AND FOR THEIR RESULTS.
BID/ASK SPREADS, BROKERAGE COMMISSION, CLEARING, EXCHANGE AND REGULATORY FEES WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE NET OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF YOUR ACCOUNT. PRIOR TO MAKING A DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY INVESTMENT MAKE SURE YOU FULLY UNDERSTAND THE FEES ASSOCIATED WITH TRADING.
EXAMPLES OF HISTORIC PRICE MOVES OR EXTREME MARKET CONDITIONS ARE NOT MEANT TO IMPLY THAT SUCH MOVES OR CONDITIONS ARE COMMON OCCURRENCES OR ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR.
HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS HAVE MANY INHERENT LIMITATIONS, SOME OF WHICH ARE DESCRIBED BELOW. NO REPRESENTATION IS BEING MADE THAT ANY ACCOUNT WILL OR IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE PROFITS OR LOSSES SIMILAR TO THOSE SHOWN IN FACT, THERE ARE FREQUENTLY SHARP DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND THE ACTUAL RESULTS SUBSEQUENTLY ACHIEVED BY ANY PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM. ONE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS IS THAT THEY ARE GENERALLY PREPARED WITH THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT.
IN ADDITION, HYPOTHETICAL TRADING DOES NOT INVOLVE FINANCIAL RISK, AND NO HYPOTHETICAL TRADING RECORD CAN COMPLETELY ACCOUNT FOR THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL RISK IN ACTUAL TRADING. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ABILITY TO WITHSTAND LOSSES OR TO ADHERE TO A PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM IN SPITE OF TRADING LOSSES ARE MATERIAL POINTS WHICH CAN ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS. THERE ARE NUMEROUS OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO THE MARKETS IN GENERAL OR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY SPECIFIC TRADE PROGRAM WHICH CANNOT BE FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE PREPARATION OF THE HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND ALL OF WHICH CAN ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS.
YOU SHOULD CAREFULLY CONSIDER WHETHER SUCH TRADING IS SUITABLE FOR YOU IN LIGHT OF YOUR CIRCUMSTANCES AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES.
THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS REPORT CONTAINS RESEARCH, MARKET COMMENTARY AND TRADE RECOMMENDATIONS. YOU MAY BE SOLICITED FOR AN ACCOUNT BY ONE OF OUR REPRESENTATIVES OR EMPLOYEES. IT SHOULD BE KNOWN THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR FIRM MAY TRADE FUTURES AND OPTIONS FOR THEIR OWN ACCOUNTS OR THOSE OF OTHERS. DUE TO VARIOUS FACTORS (SUCH AS MARGIN REQUIREMENTS, RISK FACTORS, TRADING OBJECTIVES, TRADING INSTRUCTIONS, TRADING STRATEGIES, AND OTHER FACTORS) SUCH TRADING MAY RESULT IN THE LIQUIDATION OR INITIATION OF FUTURES OR OPTIONS POSITIONS THAT DIFFER FROM THE OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOUND IN THIS REPORT.
